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Abstract
With nominal wage rigidities, it is crucial to distinguish whether wages are
set by workers or firms – whether we have monopoly or monopsony power.
This paper provides a model of monopsony power in the labour market and
a monopsonistic Phillips Curve. If wages are set by firms who face nominal
rigidities, and there is inflation, firms cannot adjust their wages fully. The real
wage falls, and labour supply hence output decreases. This provides a Phillips
Curve where the output gap is negatively correlated with wage inflation. In
such a world monetary policy affects the intertemporal labour supply, while the
Phillips Curve is a labour demand curve. Interest rate cuts reduce the labour
supply instead of boosting demand: they are contractionary.
JEL codes: E24, E31, E52, J42
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1. Introduction1
Policymakers have recently argued that monopsony is increasingly pervasive2
in the labour market.2 With the fall in unionization and collective bargaining3
1Email: charles.dennery@epfl.ch. I am grateful to Gianluca Benigno and Ricardo Reis for
their guidance in this project. I also want to thank Alan Manning, Wouter den Haan, Luisa
Lambertini, as well as Laura Castillo-Martinez, Chao He, Christian Proebsting, Marc-Antoine
Ramelet and one anonymous referee for useful discussions and comments. All errors are mine.
2Robinson (1933) originally defined monopsony as a market situation in which there is only
one buyer, as opposed to monopoly with only one seller. More generally, it also encompasses
any situation of imperfect competition where buyers dominate their input market, and face
an elastic supply curve so that they can choose the price (or wage) that they offer. Firms
with monopsony power can set lower wages than in a competitive market.
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(documented for example in CEA (2016) or IMF (2017)), monopolistic unions4
are no longer a good description of the labour market. The increase in self-5
employment, flexible and part-time work – the so called gig economy – has made6
work more divisible and insecure (Haldane 2017). However, the consequence of7
these trends in labor market power for monetary policy is unclear. Is monopsony8
simply leading to lower wages? Or is there a more fundamental change? New9
Keynesian models assume that suppliers have market power and set their rates:10
the producer sets her own price, and/or the worker/union sets her own wage.11
What happens when wages are set by employers instead of employees, and12
they face nominal rigidities? In this paper, I argue that it not only affects the13
wage level, but also the Phillips Curve and monetary policy. Low interest rates14
become contractionary, instead of being expansionary.15
Monopsony and the Phillips Curve16
The New Keynesian model with nominal wage rigidities usually assumes that17
wages are set by workers or unions having monopoly power. Individual workers18
or unions face a labor demand curve that is not perfectly elastic. They commit19
to a wage and are willing to work any amount at this wage. Hence the economy is20
(labour) demand-constrained. Here, I look instead at the effect of monopsonistic21
employers setting wages for their employees. Individual employers face an elastic22
labour supply curve : they have monopsony power. Since they commit to23
provide employment to anyone willing to work at the posted wage, the economy24
is now (labour) supply-constrained.325
In the NK wage monopoly model, firms’ demand for labour is the result26
of an intertemporal Euler equation: if wages are higher today than tomorrow,27
or with high real rates, firms demand less labour today. Hence high interest28
rates reduce labour demand, while labour supply is fixed by nominal rigidities29
and doesn’t react to the interest rate. On the other hand, if nominal rigidities30
apply to the demand side, labour demand no longer reacts to the interest rate,31
3With monopsony there is no notion of voluntary unemployment; instead there is voluntary
job rationing: firms’ labour demand is inefficiently low given the low real wage.
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but the supply of labour does, with an Euler equation. If wages are higher32
today than tomorrow, or with high real rates, workers will work more today,33
and enjoy more leisure tomorrow: high interest rates are expansionary.4 Since34
shocks to the natural or nominal rate of interest now affect the intertemporal35
supply equation, and not the intertemporal demand equation as before, they36
now qualify as supply shocks – instead of demand shocks.37
Related literature38
Monopsony (or oligopsony) has been studied both theoretically and empir-39
ically in the labour literature, as well as in other markets (see, among others,40
Manning 2003, Murray 1995 or more recently Morlacco 2019). Theoretical mod-41
els of monopsony have usually relied on the Salop (1979) or Hotelling (1929)42
models of geographical differentiation, or on search frictions as in Burdett and43
Mortensen (1998). Recent papers of oligopsony in the labour market such as44
Berger et al. (2019) have relied instead on a model with a constant elasticity45
of substitution. Based on Horvath (2000), it is the mirror analog of CES mo-46
nopolistic competition: workers have a taste for diversity and work in several47
firms/sectors5– as opposed to monopolistic competition as in Erceg et al. (2000)48
where firms have a taste for diversity and work with different worker types. A49
CES model is particularly tractable and suitable to study the interaction of50
monopsony and inflation, which is the key novel contribution of this paper.51
This paper is also related to to the recent literature looking at the growing52
role of very large and powerful firms. Eeckhout and de Loecker (2018), or Gutier-53
rez and Philippon (2017) have documented an increase in monopoly power,54
where firms charge higher prices, and output is sub-optimally low. Policymak-55
ers such as CEA (2016) and IMF (2017) have highlighted the shift of bargaining56
4The usual NK model with price rigidities and flexible wages can also feature this intertem-
poral equation. It is however irrelevant, because nominal rigidities only apply to goods not
labour, and the relevant Euler equation relates to the demand for goods.
5Horvath (2000) assumes that agents share their time across sectors while for me it is across
firms. While most people work with only one employer in real life, this simplification can be
rationalised with a discrete choice model, along the lines of Anderson et al (1987).
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power from employees to employers, new features of the labour markets, and the57
resulting effect on weak wage growth but without looking at monopsony power58
specifically. Recent papers have looked at the link between monopsony power59
and weak wage growth. Azar et al. (2017) find a strong negative relationship60
between monopsony power and wages in the US. Looking at US manufacturing,61
Benmelech et al. (2018) document the same effect, though on a much smaller62
scale. Abel et al. (2018) find similar results to Benmelech et al. in the UK, for63
a larger firm sample.64
Last, this paper is related to the debate on the shape of the Phillips Curve65
(Ball and Mazumder 2011, Blanchard 2016). It is also indirectly related to the66
reversal rate literature (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2018), where interest rates67
below a certain level become contractionary due to financial frictions, although68
the channel of contractionary low interest rates is different here.69
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 builds a model of70
monopsony, derives a monopsonistic Phillips Curve, interprets monetary policy71
in this setup and discusses the results. Section 3 concludes.72
2. The Phillips curve with monopsony73
In this section I build a model of monopsony power in the labour market,74
which allows me to write a monopsonistic Phillips Curve.75
2.1. Flexible steady state76
Let me first set up the model without nominal rigidities.77
Households78
As in Horvath (2000), a worker allocates its time across different employers:79
there is a continuum of firms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. By working Li with each80
employer i (at a wage Wi), the total wage received is
∫ 1
0
WiLidi. Disutility of81
4
work depends on an effective labour Lt, which is a CES convex function of each82
labour Lt(i) supplied to each firm i:
6
83
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
1+1/ηdi
] 1
1+1/η
η = ∂ lnLi∂ lnWi |L,C is the wage elasticity of labour supply.84
The consumption good Ct is assumed to be homogeneous at a price Pt. The85
representative households maximizes a separable utility function, subject to a86
budget constraint:87
maxE0
+∞∑
t=0
βt [U(Ct)− V (Lt)]
st. PtCt +QtBt = Bt−1 +
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di+
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di
From every firm i, the household receives a dividend Dt(i), and a wage88
compensation Wt(i)Lt(i) for supplying Lt(i) to firm i. New bonds Bt can be89
bought or sold at price Qt, the stochastic discount factor of the household.90
The Euler equation pins down the stochastic discount factor91
Qt = Etβ
Pt
Pt+1
U ′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)
(1)
The first order condition for each Lt(i) brings92
u′(Ct)
Pt
Wt(i) =
(
Lt(i)
Lt
)1/η
V ′(Lt) (2)
There is a substitution across jobs, and between leisure and consumption:93
6See Berger et al. (2019) for a discrete choice probabilistic microfoundation of this monop-
sony assumption, along the lines of Anderson et al (1987): workers have idiosyncratic prefer-
ences over different types of jobs and work for only one employer. As relative wages change,
some workers fully substitute to a new occupation, creating imperfect aggregate substitutabil-
ity. If preferences follow a Gumbel distribution, this results in CES.
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Property 1. Write Wt the wage aggregate as94
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1+ηdi
] 1
1+η
(1) As the worker takes prices and wages as given, the aggregate real wage is95
equal to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of labour and consumption:96
Wt
Pt
=
V ′(Lt)
U ′(Ct)
= MRSt (3)
(2) Firm i’s relative labour supply is a function of its relative wage:97
Lt(i)
Lt
=
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)η
(4)
(3) Combining the MRS = WP condition with the Euler equation of consump-98
tion, one can write an intertemporal labour supply equation:99
Qt
V ′(Lt)
Wt
= βEt
V ′(Lt+1)
Wt+1
(5)
In logs, with rn = − lnβ, this writes v′(lt) = (it − Etpi
w
t+1 − r
n) + Etv
′(lt+1)100
At the optimum, the worker is indifferent between earning 1$ tomorrow, or101
earning Qt today to buy a bond yielding 1$ tomorrow. This intertemporal102
labour supply equation doesn’t exist when monopolistic workers set sticky wages103
since they do not choose their labour supply. As explained in footnote 4 above,104
this equation holds but it is irrelevant when wages are flexible.105
Firms106
Representative firm i takes prices as given, and has a production function107
Yt(i) = F (Lt(i)). It maximizes its profits subject to the labour supply curve:108
max
Lt(i),Wt(i)
P.F (Lt(i))−Wt(i).Lt(i) st.
(
Lt(i)
Lt
)
=
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)η
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The optimal wage is below the marginal product of labour (MPL):109
Wt(i) =
Pt.F
′(Lt(i))
1 + 1/η
Wt
Pt
=
MPLt
1 + 1/η
With flexible prices and wages, the wage is equal to the MRS and is a markup110
below the MPL. Hence this is not a state of voluntary unemployment where111
workers work too little given the current wage. Instead, jobs are rationed and112
firms hire too little, given the wage. Monopsonistic competition in the labour113
market is similar to monopolistic competition in the goods market: the real114
wage is below the marginal product of labour.115
2.2. Sticky wages116
Let me assume that the firm faces a Calvo fairy when setting its wage: only
a fraction (1− θ) of firms can reset their wage in each period. The wage is set
to maximize the discounted profits subject to the labour supply curve:
max
W∗t (i)
Et
+∞∑
k=0
(θβ)k
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
[Pt+kF (Lt+k(i))−W
∗
t (i)Lt+k(i)] (6)
st.
(
Lt+k(i)
Lt+k
)
=
(
W ∗t (i)
Wt+k
)η
Around a zero-inflation steady state, the FOC provides a Phillips Curve:7117
Property 2 (Calvo monopsonistic Phillips Curve).
piwt =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
(
−1
1 + αη
)
(mrst −mplt) + βEt[pi
w
t+1] (7)
α = −LF
′′(L)
F ′(L) is the elasticity of the production function and
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ comes118
from the Calvo modeling. mrst and mplt are the log deviations of the MRS119
and MPL at t, hence (mrst − mplt) is a measure of real economic activity.120
Monopsony only plays a role through η and the negative sign.121
7The log approximation of the optimal Calvo wage (dropping the markup) is
w∗t = (1−βθ)
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)
k[pt+mplt+k|t]. If mpl = −αl, mplt+k|t = mplt+k+αη(wt+k−w
∗
t ).
Using the fact that mrs = w − p, and standard algebra, the Phillips Curve can be derived.
7
I compare this monopsony model with a baseline NK monopoly model with122
wage stickiness but flexible prices based on Erceg et al. (2000).8 In the normal123
wage Phillips Curve with monopoly power,9 wages are set by employees. With124
a positive labour demand shock, the nominal wage cannot increase, so employ-125
ment increases above potential. This leads to positive wage inflation to close126
this positive employment gap. Hence the positive inflation-employment gap cor-127
relation. On the other hand, when wages are set by monopsonistic employers, a128
positive labour supply shock increases employment above potential, as the rigid129
wage does not fall. This leads to wage deflation to close this employment gap.130
2.3. Supply, demand and monetary policy131
It is useful to write the model in terms of labour supply and demand de-132
pending on wage inflation, to compare it with the usual wage monopoly model.133
In the monopoly wage model, the WP = MPL condition for firms brings134
(piwt+1 − pi
p
t+1) = (mplt+1 − mplt). Combined with the Euler equation of con-135
sumption, it yields the firms’ intertemporal labour demand equation:10136
[u′(ct) +mplt] = (it − Etpi
w
t+1 − r
n
t ) + Et[u
′(ct+1) +mplt+1] (8)
rnt is the (possibly time varying) natural interest rate. With a Taylor rule137
it = φpi
w
t , then – for given expectations of future variables – this provides a138
negative demand relationship between wage inflation and labour. It is then139
8Most models with sticky wages also feature sticky prices. However I assume flexible prices
to make the two models most comparable. When firms with goods monopoly power and labour
monopsony power face nominal rigidities in both markets, output depends on a difference of
the price and wage inflation, instead of an average as in EHL (see Dennery, 2020).
9The normal NK model with sticky wages and flexible prices typically displays employers
with a taste for diversity among worker types, with an elasticity of substitution ǫ. With φ the
disutility curvature, the Calvo wage monopoly Phillips Curve can be written
πt =
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
(
1
1+φǫ
)
(mrst −mplt) + βE[πt+1]
10The typical price NK model features 3 equations: the price PC, the Euler equation of
consumption, and a Taylor rule as a function of price inflation. In the wage monopoly model,
we have 4 equations: the wage PC, a wage inflation Taylor rule, the Euler equation of con-
sumption, and the condition W/P = MPL. Eq (8) combines these last two for simplicity.
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combined with the upward-sloping labour supply PC with wage inflation and140
labour piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 + λ(mrst −mplt)141
On the other hand, in the monopsony wage model, the Phillips Curve is142
a demand curve in terms of labour and wage inflation. The corresponding143
intertemporal labour supply curve is eq. (5), which in logs becomes11144
v′(lt) = (it − Etpi
w
t+1 − r
n
t ) + Etv
′(lt+1) (9)
With a Taylor rule it = φpi
w
t ,
12 this provides a positive supply relationship145
between wage inflation and labour – for given expectations of future variables.146
It is then combined with the downward-sloping monopsony PC, which is the147
firms’ labour demand equation: piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 − λ(mrst −mplt).148
In what follows, I assume the following Taylor rule: i = φwpi pi
w. The difference149
between the wage monopoly and monopsony models is displayed in figure 1,150
and does not depend qualitatively on the specific calibration of the two models.151
Under monopoly the Phillips Curve (PC) is a supply curve combined with an152
intertemporal demand curve (D), while under monopsony it is a demand curve153
combined with an intertemporal supply curve (S).13154
Interest rate shocks155
Under monopoly, a drop in the policy rate (or an increase in the natural156
interest rate) raises demand. Output increases above its potential, the positive157
output gap raises wage inflation. Conversely, under monopsony, impatience158
lowers the labour supply today relative to tomorrow. With a negative output159
gap, inflation increases and raises the nominal and real rates.160
11Under monopsony we have 4 equations: the wage PC, a wage inflation Taylor rule, the
Euler equation of consumption, and W/P = MRS. Eq (9) combines these last two.
12Under monopsony, with a Taylor rule i = φyy + φwπ π
w, the analog of the Bullard and
Mitra (2002) condition becomes φwπ −
1−β
κ
φy > 1. Hence the rule is unchanged if φy = 0.
13Denote σ = −CU ′′(C)/U ′(C), α = −LF ′′(L)/F ′(L) and φ = LV ′′(L)/V ′(L).
In the monopoly case, the monopoly PC and labour demand equation write, respectively:
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 +λ(σ(1−α)+φ+α)lt and (σ(1−α)+α)(lt−Etlt+1) = −(it−Etπ
w
t+1 − r
n
t ).
In the monopsony case, the monopsony PC and labour supply equation write, respectively:
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 − λ˜(σ(1− α) + φ+ α)lt and φ(lt − Etlt+1) = (it − Etπ
w
t+1 − r
n
t ).
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Figure 1: The monopoly vs. monopsony models. Under monopoly the PC is a supply curve,
while it is a demand curve under monopsony. The dashed lines show the effect of a decrease
in the policy rate i, or an increase in rn.
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Figure 2: Response of (y, πw, i) to an impatience shock
Figure 2 shows that qualitatively, inflation and interest rates increase in161
both models (though the magnitude depends on calibration). As the real in-162
terest rate doesn’t increase enough to match the increased impatience, output163
increases under monopoly but falls under monopsony. Crucially with monop-164
sony, impatience shocks are no longer positive demand shocks, but negative165
supply shocks, as they apply to the intertemporal supply curve now.166
3. Conclusion167
This paper first introduced a model of monopsonistic competition with a con-168
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) between jobs similar to Horvath (2000).169
While the monopolistic competition model features imperfect substitution of170
employers between workers or worker types – a love of variety – monopsonistic171
10
competition features imperfect substitutability of workers across different em-172
ployers or job types. Workers prefer to work for different employers as it brings173
a lower disutility than working for one sole employer.174
Having introduced this model of monopsony, it is easy to build a New Key-175
nesian model with wages set by monopsonistic employers. The difference with176
the classical monopoly Phillips Curve is that the output-inflation correlation177
becomes negative. Since interest rate shocks affect the intertemporal labour178
supply curve instead of the consumption demand curve, these interest shocks179
have the opposite effect of the normal monopoly case. An interest rate drop180
reduces the labour supply and is contractionary.181
Looking at heterogeneity is an obvious avenue for future research. Employ-182
ers have monopsony power in some sectors while others still show employee183
monopoly power. Studying mega firms with both monopoly power over their184
consumers and monopsony power over their employees is another promising path185
that I explore in Dennery (2020): output then depends on a difference between186
price and wage inflation. Last, shifting the bargaining power – and wage rigidi-187
ties – from workers to firms would also add realism: the slope of the Phillips188
Curve would now depend on both sides’ relative bargaining power.189
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